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No Music in Timbuktu:  
 





Coordinator Daniel Benjamin of the State Department’s Office of Counterterrorism spoke on 
December 8, 2011 to the National Press Club about the state of the terror group Al Qaeda 
(Benjamin, 2011). In his speech, the Coordinator declared that the strength of Al Qaeda, while 
still an ongoing threat to the security of the United States, had been significantly reduced 
primarily due to the termination of its founding leader, Osama bin Laden. 
“There is no question that bin Laden’s departure from the scene was the 
most important milestone ever in the fight against al-Qaida. Bin Laden 
was al-Qaida’s founder and sole commander for 22 years. He was an 
iconic leader whose personal story had a profound attraction for violent 
extremists, and he was the prime advocate of the group’s focus on 
America as a terrorist target… The loss of bin Laden puts the group on a 
path of decline that will be difficult to reverse” (Benjamin, 2011, para. 
2). 
 
Coordinator Benjamin went on to note several developments, including the movements towards 
democracy in various countries known as the Arab Spring, which further showed changes for the 
better in the Middle East. Still, he qualified that Al Qaeda, and more importantly its various 
affiliate groups remained an active threat, “Indeed, even as the core of al-Qaida experienced 
massive setbacks, activity by the affiliates continued to spread geographically, and other groups 
with AQ-related ideological leanings gained prominence” (Benjamin, 2011, para. 11). 
Coordinator Benjamin argues that various Muslim countries of the region are moving away from 
Islamic fundamentalism that defines groups like Al Qaeda and towards freer societies, more 





welcoming to the United States. According to the department, while still in existence, the 
remaining strength of Al Qaeda is no longer a threat to the United States (Benjamin, 2011). 
Less than four months later on March 22, 2012, Malian soldiers in western Africa held a 
military coup, deposing the democratically elected President Amadou Toure and suspending the 
nation’s constitution after two decades of peaceful governance (Al Jazeera; 2012). This led to a 
chain of events which ultimately allowed for the major Al Qaeda affiliate of the region, the Al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Along with native Tuareg rebels, the AQIM took over 
vast territories in the northern part of Mali and called for the creation of an independent state of 
Azawad. Within three days, the three major cities of Northern Mali - Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu - 
fell to the rebel forces, effectively dividing the country in half (Al Jazeera, 2012). By April 6th, 
the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the primary Tuareg force in the 
north, declared independence from Mali altogether, calling on the international community to 
accept them as a sovereign entity (BBC News, 2012).  While not considered the largest or most 
organized division of Al Qaeda, the forces of the AQIM did what other factions have never done 
before, exploited internal division in order to establish a base on a national level for their 
operations and terror attacks in the region as well as worldwide. 
Months passed without progress by the Malian forces, except for infighting between 
factions of the Tuareg rebel groups of MNLA and the militant Islamic group of Ansar Dine, little 
changed in the north until France intervened on January 11, 2013 (Voice of America, 2013). 
With the support of French airborne brigades, the Malian forces began driving back the Islamist 
factions from northern cities, retaking Gao January 26, Timbuktu January 27 and Kidal January 
28, effectively ending the occupation of AQIM of northern Mali and ending the Tuareg rebellion 





(Voice of America, 2013). Now, the fighting has moved into the stage of defensive warfare 
around major cities as well as guerrilla operations in the Kidal Mountains and Sahara Desert 
where the fleeing Islamist forces have gathered (Voice of America, 2013). Operations are 
ongoing with little sign of ending soon. Despite the death of Osama bin Laden and despite the 
founding of several democratic governments in formerly despotic nations like Egypt and Libya, 
Al Qaeda remains a viable threat. This threat not only applies to Muslim countries in the Middle 
East and Africa, but to Europe and the United States as well. 
This paper looks at the conflict in Mali as an example how the Islamic fundamentalism 
and global terrorism of Al Qaeda has not dissipated, despite the hopes of American foreign 
policy makers to the contrary. First, I will provide some background on the country Mali, 
including its geography, its people and a brief history of its government which, until recently had 
been the shining example of democracy on the African continent. Igo into the events leading up 
to the collapse of the democratic regime and the subsequent rise to power of Al Qaeda in the 
North. Next, Idiscuss the response of Mali to the rebellion as well as the response of neighboring 
African countries. Then, I discuss the timely intervention of French forces that halted the 
advances of Islamist forces in the country and the continuing response of the international 
community, including the United States. Finally, I conclude by discussing possible solutions to 
resolve the chaos taking place, as well as possible options the United States has that will both 
benefit the suffering civilians of Mali as well as its security interests. 
A Brief History of Mali 
According to Lieutenant Colonel Kalifa Keita (1998) of the Army of the Republic of 
Mali, “The most substantial challenge to Mali’s stability since independence has been insurgency 





by Tuareg peoples” (p. 6) The Tuaregs, a Berber people that dwell in the northern reaches of 
Mali differ drastically from the southern Malian tribes. They live a nomadic and pastoral life of 
herding and caravan trade, with unique cultural adaptations to the hostile environment of the 
Sahara (Keita, 1998). Thus over the decades, they have been subjugated as a lesser people in the 
political system of Mali. This division led to animosity, both on the parts of the Tauregs and the 
Malians constantly combating them for control of the northern reaches of the country (Keita, 
1998). This division currently defines the rebel movement, which includes the Taureg 
community insidiously backed by the AQIM branch of Al Qaeda. While some in the West 
romanticize the roaming aspects of Tuareg life, the majority of Malians see them in a far more 
negative manner (Keita, 1998). Keita (1998) explains that, “West Africans tend to view the 
Tuaregs as lazy, prone to violence and criminality, opportunistic, ethnically chauvinistic, and 
unpatriotic. These views have been reinforced by Tuareg insurgencies in Mali and Niger” (p. 9). 
This hostility has remained a fundamental aspect of Malian life, and led to several conflicts over 
the decades between the north and south. 
In many ways the geography of Mali mirrors its internal political struggles. The country 
of Mali lies in the western interior of the continent sharing borders with several countries, the 
largest of which is Algeria to the north. The northern portion of the country lies within the 
unforgiving Sahara desert, with poor resources, few cities and a population made up mostly of 
nomadic tribes. The south, meanwhile, contains parts of the Niger River and benefits from 
tropical forests and good soil due to the Inter-tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) (Gordon, 
1996). This zone allows for good rain seasons, better conditions for farming and thus greater 
prosperity (Gordon, 1996).  





This geographic divide mirrors the current struggle between north and south. Although 
the south is more prosperous, it struggled economically since its independence from France in 
1960 (Keita, 1998). The new government first turned to socialism, but later Western capitalism 
and influence when economic growth failed to materialize (Keita, 1998). According to 
Lieutenant Colonel Keita (1998), who fought in the Army of the Republic of Mali against the 
Tuaregs in 1990, weak economic growth and stagnate social development, still resonated bitter 
feelings in the Northern regions of Mali like Kidal. This limited development of infrastructure 
and economic stability only reinforced the perception among many Tuaregs that their suffering 
was the result of Malian hatred and discrimination (Keita, 1998). Despite all efforts at 
reconciliation after the Tuareg rebellions, the Tuaregs still consider themselves the true heirs and 
owners of their ancestral lands. For some, this also includes ownership of the riches in gold and 
uranium they believe lie hidden underneath the sands of the desert (Welsh, 2012). The Tuaregs 
thus continue to harbor dreams of independence and are willing to attain it through any means 
necessary. 
Finally, religion plays a significant role in Mali. Over 90% of the country is Muslim 
(Department of State, 2008). However, this 90% is not of the same religious or ideological mind 
as Al Qaeda. The Tauregs, though joined with the AQIM to gain political freedom from the 
Malian government, for the most part do not follow the fundamental Islamic tradition of Sharia 
espoused by Al Qaeda (Welsh, 2012). Some Tuareg independence groups such as Ansar Dine are 
Salafist, or radical Islamist (Welsh, 2012). The rest, including the relatively secular MNLA, 
follow a form of Sufi Islam mixed with many African traditions (Welsh, 2012). As one Taureg 
nomad put it, “We are Muslims but we can't stand the Salafi way. We want our sisters to feel the 





wind in their hair” (Welsh, 2012, para. 59). Thus, the conflict is not one motivated by jihad, at 
least for the native Tauregs that make up the majority of the rebellion. The policy of Al Qaeda 
towards music and the sacred sites in Timbuktu also estranged many still in the north (Conan, 
2012). Jihad soldiers destroyed many sights and even “eviscerated” entire scores of music 
(Conan, 2012, para. 22). Ultimately, AQIM and its men may control the rebellion, but their 
ideology is not necessarily accepted by the people they control. 
The Collapse of Democracy 
One of the more interesting aspects of the situation in Mali is that, although within a 
climate of political change away from autocratic governments towards democratic ones, Mali did 
the opposite. Instead of heading towards democratic governance, it reverted to political 
instability and civil war by a military coup. This is not new to Mali however. In fact, the cycle of 
economic weakness, Tuareg grievances fomenting into rebellion and military coup replacing 
ineffective governance fits a very basic pattern in the historical fabric of the country. In 1968, 
eight years after Mali’s independence, fourteen young but frustrated army officers under 
Lieutenant Moussa Traore ousted socialist reformer Modibo Keita due to his failure to repress a 
Tuareg rebellion over the lack of economic progress (Keita, 1998). Under Traore, Mali shifted 
towards capitalism and Western investment for economic growth, but after two decades found 
little success (Keita, 1998). This lack of economic improvement and failed development of the 
Northern provinces led to a second Tuareg rebellion in 1990 (Keita, 1998). Though also 
repressed, their grievances led to a “Committee of Transition for the Safety of the People” which 
positioned another army official Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumany Toure to be the first 
democratically elected President of Mali in 1991 (Keita, 1998). The country remained an 





exceptional example of the possibilities of any African nation that accepted democracy for nearly 
two decades. Yet, the one consistent tension within Mali is the Tuaregs demands, threats to 
social stability and conflict with Malian soldiers. This endless fighting once again led to an 
increasing sense of frustration among the current soldiers of the Malian army, unable to 
effectively counter the Taureg opposition. This frustration ultimately led them to turn against the 
Toure administration in an attempt to properly defend the country themselves. 
Unbeknown to the majority of the army, for the past year Al Qaeda insurgents were 
infiltrating the northern regions of Mali. The AQIM, initially the Salafist Group for Preaching 
and Combat (GSPC) that fought for Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria, affiliated itself with 
Osama bin Laden in 2007 for greater financial support and name recognition (Steinberg and 
Werenfels, 2007). This change in name was seen by the Algerians as a sign of decline and 
weakness at first, but as German foreign policy experts Steinberg and Werenfels (2007) state, 
“reports about growing recruitment of non-Algerian North Africans and the spread of terrorist 
activities in neighbouring countries hint at the fact that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb – while 
losing some support among Algerians – might at the same time win more internationalist minded 
young North Africans” (p. 412). Their analysis proved to be correct, with the current conflict in 
Mali as evidence to the spread of the AQIM’s influence and ability to destabilize the regions 
North and West Africa. 
Many of these Salafist Muslims, recruited across the Middle East, Africa as well as 
among Malian Tuaregs, crossed over to Libya during the 2011 Civil War to fight for Muammar 
Kaddafi. When the Kaddafi regime fell, these soldiers returned to their homes with training and 
heavy weaponry. Some like Colonel Habi Sadat, who deserted the Malian army to join the rebels 





in 2012, noticed the presence of Al Qaeda, “Mali opened the field to al-Qaeda - to roam among 
the camps and villages, to build relationships with the people” (Welsh, 2012, para. 56). This in 
part fueled many soldiers into turning against the president. This implicit acceptance of Tauregs 
and jihadists moving through the north, made the job of soldiers more difficult in effectively 
fighting them (Welsh, 2012). Still, many in Mali, including the army and the subsequent interim 
unity cabinet, did not realize the threat to the north (Welsh, 2012). Once the government fell and 
the army consolidated its forces to the south in order to gain complete control, the AQIM and its 
Taureg supporters quickly took over the cities of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu in a three day 
offensive (Welsh, 2012). 
The state of the northern half of the country became one of strife and suffering. 
Thousands of Malians fled south to the Malian capital of Bamako, further straining the fragile 
government still in flux between army and new political control (Conan, 2012). Not only that, 
but in the north, Al Qaeda soldiers imposed Sharia law, prosecuted women and destroyed 
heretical structures that did not fit with the ideological parameters of the organization (Conan, 
2012). Many who fled the northern half of Mali brought with them stories of abuse to women 
and destruction of sacred buildings due to the new order (Conan, 2012). Still, the desire of the 
Tuaregs for political independence came within reach as a result of the strength and support of 
the AQIM. Despite their own distrust of the group, they were the enemies of their long standing 
enemies. Until convinced that their best interest lie with returning Mali to a single nation, the 
Tuaregs remained unwilling to fight the ones now in control, Al Qaeda (Conan, 2012). 
Reponses to Rebellion: Mali, Africa and the World 





The new Malian government and the Malian army had great difficulty in combating the 
AQIM in the north. After removing the garrisons of soldiers from the northern cities of Kidal, 
Gao and Timbuktu to implement the coup in the south, the army had many setbacks in regaining 
those cities from the forces of Al Qaeda and the Tuaregs (Conan, 2012). Further sapping its 
strength, the army split its force to maintain order in the south and its interim unity government. 
Eventually this caused the Malian government to seek aid outside its borders, mostly with 
Algeria to the north (Conan, 2012). Nigeria and several other neighboring African nations 
represented by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also raised 
concerns about the new Malian government and the way it came to power at the hands of the 
military (Conan, 2012). Even more worrisome to the members of ECOWAS was the threat of 
rebellion spreading to their own nations (Conan, 2012). Several have their own nomadic 
populations similar to the Tuaregs - at risk of resorting to rebellion for political autonomy 
(Conan, 2012). Furthermore, the threat of civil war and internal strife has the added concern of 
attracting more Al Qaeda affiliates, dragging the entire region into chaos, and the threat of 
terrorist attacks (Conan, 2012). All of these threats have for the time being united several African 
nations to solve the issue and restore order between the rebellious Tuaregs of Mali and the rest of 
the country. How they will oust the rebels or defeat the Islamic fundamentalism taking root there 
is still very much an obstacle to resolving the conflict. 
Help came not from the United States but rather Mali’s former colonial ruler, France. 
Seeing a potential threat to Algeria just north of Mali and the French homeland itself, President 
Francois Hollande entered the conflict in January 11, 2013 (Voice of America, 2013). Quick and 
decisive deployment of French airborne brigades turned the tide of the war almost immediately 





against the Islamist forces of AQIM. With better intelligence, military resources and training, the 
combined French and Malian troops moved north, recapturing the primary cities of Gao, 
Timbuktu and Kidal (Voice of America, 2013). This success came as a result of internal 
divisions of the Tuareg resistance. While initially accepting of the AQIM’s resources and 
strength, the Tuaregs of the MNLA soon found themselves at odds with the methods of their 
allies and their own Islamist faction of Tuareg, the Ansar Dine (Voice of America, 2013). With 
the repression of music, culture and destruction of holy sites in cities like Timbuktu, fighting 
broke out in the city of Gao on June 26, 2012 (Voice of America, 2013). The MNLA and other 
Tuaregs fighting for independence, but not Sharia law or Islamic fundamentalism, were expelled 
from the city, turning to the Malian government and the international community for aid in 
expelling their now realized enemy in AQIM. With the arrival of the French the next year, the 
MNLA, forsaking its goal of independence for the moment, joined in the common cause of 
defeating AQIM, even going so far as to expel them from the city of Kidal (Voice of America, 
2013). These combined efforts led to the military defeat of AQIM and their removal from power. 
It also signaled the beginning of guerrilla war in the massive desert regions of the north (Voice 
of America, 2013). 
The United States, while committed to defeating Al Qaeda and its affiliates, are having a 
difficult time coping with the drastic changes in Mali. While calling on the rebels in the north to 
stand down in their war against the Malian government and stop its human rights violations, it 
has not wholly supported the Malian government either (Bureau of African Affairs, 2012). Due 
to the military coup that ousted the democratic and popular President Toure, the United States 
condemned the way in which the new government seized control simultaneously with the 





rebellion (Bureau of African Affairs, 2012). This sent a mixed signal to the Malian government, 
unsure whether the United States was willing to support their struggle with an Al Qaeda led 
opposition. The Obama administration and the State Department have also had difficulty in 
whether or not to consider the conflict as a major threat to the United States. According the State 
Department website, the rebels of Mali are not called Al Qaeda affiliates by name (Bureau of 
African Affairs, 2012). Yet such a devious group, which was able to gain control of a country by 
taking advantage of the openness of the democratic Malian regime in order to exploit the 
grievances of the northern Tauregs only hints at the potential damage such an organization can 
do to reach its aims of religiously-motivated war. Therefore, although the United States may not 
like the fact that a once democratic state has now unleashed a terrorist threat in Africa and the 
globe, it must decide which threat is greatest and move forward in resolving the conflict (Bureau 
of African Affairs, 2012). 
Potential Solutions 
The conflict in Mali continues, and though the timely intervention of French airborne 
troops and reversal of MNLA alliance turned the tide against AQIM, a guerrilla campaign is now 
underway with no signs of resolving itself. The first suicide attacks of the conflict started January 
26, 2013 in Gao (Al Jazeera, 2013). Islamist militants also use car bombs to attack checkpoints, 
especially ones manned by MNLA forces (BBC, 2013). Several nations, including the United 
States, pledged intelligence, resources, training officials and even drones for French and Malian 
troops (Schmitt, 2013). West African nations also came to the aid of Mali, but more for their own 
security rather than Mali’s (Conan, 2012). Fears of similar rebellions taking place in Nigeria and 
Algeria, where Taureg groups reside in various untamed regions, makes this conflict of vital 





importance throughout the region, with several different proposals for possible solutions to the 
conflict (Conan, 2012). The Malian government continues to seek support from its neighbors, 
France and the United Nations in curtailing the spread of the Al Qaeda led rebels (Conan, 2012). 
At this point the United States has limited options it can take in supporting the Malian 
government in combating AQIM. The United States could join France in combat and add its 
military predominance to the conflict. This is unlikely as the United States does not have the 
popular support or the political will to intervene in another foreign conflict as a result of the 
unpopularity of its costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq earlier in the decade. The United States 
can also continue its current level of support with its minor presence in training African troop 
and increased intelligence through its drone program (Schmitt, 2013). This, for now, seems the 
most cost-effective and easily supportable position in the Malian conflict (Schmitt, 2013). 
However, if President Obama wishes to combat the growing presence of AQIM in northern 
Africa, bold steps must be taken. In this case, Mali provides a unique opportunity for the 
foundation of policy that can dramatically alter the situation in North Africa. 
It is clear now that Mali must answer the issue of Tuareg independence if it ever wishes 
to reach a level of national security and stability. As the third repeated instance of political and 
social instability as a result of Tuareg rebellion, Mali can no longer ignore the will of its own 
people. Past promises of development have failed to reform the northern reaches of the country 
(Keita, 1998). Past threats of force from the Malian government have only managed to subdue 
nationalist sentiments for decades at a time (Keita, 1998). Changes in regime have only muted 
the underlying tensions, but never fully dealt with them. Thus, I argue the best option the Malian 





government can take and one the United States should call for and support is the independence of 
northern Mali and the creation of a new state of Azawad.   
It is certainly recognized that the conflict in Mali is a unique situation. The policies 
pertinent to it should not be broadly or categorically applied to every future conflict against Al 
Qaeda affiliates in Africa, the Middle East or any other region of the world. Still, making 
northern Mali an independent state ruled by Tuaregs would give them the independence they 
have strived for since France freed Mali in 1960. It would reduce the financial burden of Mali by 
removing the north from its jurisdiction. Rather than diverting precious resources to develop the 
north and protecting its borders, costs that had in the past sapped the ability of Mali to govern the 
entire country, would now be gone, allowing them to focus development entirely in the south. 
Furthermore, Tuaregs could promote their own form of government based on their own cultural 
heritage. The main objections to this option stem from Mali and its neighboring nations with 
similar Tuareg groups. Allowing the Tuaregs in Mali their autonomy would stir similar desires in 
Niger and Algeria where Tuaregs live on lands with huge deposits of natural resources (Conan, 
2012). Losing such resources could certainly harm the economies of these various countries. Not 
only that, but many African nations would argue that there is no legal justification for the 
creation of a new state which their former colonial power France never authorized at the time of 
independence (Gordon, 1996). 
The question thus becomes which is the lesser of two evils facing Mali and its neighbors 
in the region. Mali can maintain the status quo, use the forces of France to win a temporary 
victory over Islamist militants, and try to develop the north so that the Tuaregs never rise up 
again. This is what Mali has done since 1960, with the results readily apparent. But, Mali can 





also completely upend the policy norms of the region by giving the Tuaregs the independence 
they want, removing the main motivation for strife and the main tool AQIM used to divide the 
nation in the first place. The onus lies with these African governments in Mali and its neighbors, 
as well as with the international community and the United States, to put aside these fears and 
come to the understanding that the Tauregs might indeed gain some political autonomy if it 
means securing the country and by default the region against terrorist plots. France, as the 
original colonial ruler of the region and country to bestow independence in 1960 could play a 
critical role by supporting Tuareg independence and the creation of Azawad.  
Of course, the Tuaregs would initially need greater aid from foreign institutions and 
Western nations in providing the proper governmental apparatus and expelling terrorist groups 
like AQIM. However, the United States, France, and ECOWAS have already contributed 
valuable resources and manpower just to stave off the collapse of the Malian state. Rather than 
waiting for the next Tuareg uprising, resolving the decades-long issue now with independence 
would remove the problem all together. Tuaregs would also be expected to take on the 
responsibility of security, reject the notions of Islamic fundamentalism and remove all harbingers 
of the ideology from the area. Still, with the prospect of independence, such responsibilities, 
would be accepted and end an issue that has plagued the nation for over five decades. 
Ultimately, the resolution to the conflict in Mali depends on a community of nations 
coming together to halt the advances of AQIM. Instability should not be risked for the sake of 
denying a portion of the population political rights and freedom. There is the potential to 
convince all Tuaregs to abandon their Al Qaeda allies for the sake of security, freedom and the 
possibility of true political autonomy. However, such plans should be made in earnest, before the 





conflict can spread to other countries and engulf the entire region in chaos and upheaval that 
threaten not only Africa, but the United States as well. 
Foreign policy expert Brian Jenkins (2012) of the RAND Corporation wrote in his 
analysis of the decline of Al Qaeda that one of the most important things to learn about the 
enemy is their understanding of the conflict with the West; “In their view, war is perpetual – this 
conflict began centuries ago and will last beyond their [current jihadists] lives” (p. ix). The 
United States has made tremendous progress with fighting Al Qaeda since it emerged as a threat 
in 2001. The death of leaders like Osama bin Laden and the several other counterterrorism 
programs around the globe have made the United States safer and weakened the threat of Al 
Qaeda from what they once were (Benjamin, 2012). Having said all of this, the current form of 
Al Qaeda in its small, spread out and amorphous organization is still very deadly to the citizens 
of the United States. While the country of Mali far off in the African continent remains one of 
the most misunderstood and unrecognized places on earth, it has the potential to play a huge part 
in American security. Allowing Al Qaeda to fester there will only lead to future conflicts in the 
region, and more importantly future threats to the American homeland. It should be a top priority 
for the United States government, not to become complacent with past victories over Al Qaeda, 
but remain vigilant, so that future attacks never occur from places like Mali. 
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